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This article presents a typological study of the Twitter accounts operated by the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA), a company specialized in online influence operations based in St. 
Petersburg, Russia. Drawing on concepts from 20th century propaganda theory, we modeled the 
IRA operations along propaganda classes and campaign targets. The study relies on two 
historical databases and data from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine to retrieve 826 user 
profiles and 6377 tweets posted by the agency between 2012 and 2017. We manually coded the 
source as identifiable, obfuscated, or impersonated and classified the campaign target of IRA 
operations using an inductive typology based on profile descriptions, images, location, language, 
and tweeted content. The qualitative variables were analyzed as relative frequencies to test the 
extent to which the IRA’s black, grey, and white propaganda are deployed with clearly-defined 
targets for short, medium, and long-term propaganda strategies. The results show that source 
classification from propaganda theory remains a valid framework to understand IRA’s 
propaganda machine and that the agency operates a composite of different user accounts tailored 
to perform specific tasks, including openly pro-Russian profiles, local American and German 
news sources, pro-Trump conservatives, and black lives matter activists. 
 




Disguised propaganda was a stable part of military operations in the 20th century as means of 
weakening enemy states (Linebarger, 1954). The aftermath of the Cold War was nonetheless 
marked by a declining trend in information warfare between enemy states, a drift shadowed by 
the waning importance of propaganda studies in the period (Briant, 2015). This uncontroversial 
assessment was recently challenged in the aftermath of the US Presidential election of 2016 and 
the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership, with multiple reports of social media 
platforms being weaponized to spread hyperpartisan content and propaganda (Bastos & Mercea, 
2019; Bessi & Ferrara, 2016). This study seeks to further explore the weaponization of social 
media platforms by inspecting 826 Twitter accounts and 6377 tweets created by the Kremlin-
linked Internet Research Agency (IRA) in St. Petersburg. 
Propaganda studies classify manipulation techniques according to different source 
classes. White propaganda refers to unambiguous, openly identifiable sources in sharp contrast to 
black propaganda in which the source is disguised. Grey propaganda sits somewhere in between 
these classes with the source not being directly credited nor identified (Becker, 1949; Doherty, 
1994; McAndrew, 2017). Propaganda models are however reminiscent from a media ecosystem 
dominated by mass media and broadcasting. As such, the classic propaganda models probe into 
processes of framing, priming, and schemata, along with a range of media effects underpinning 
information diffusion in the postwar period leading up to the Cold War (Hollander, 1972), but 
invariable predating the internet (Hermans, Klerkx, & Roep, 2015). 
We probe the propaganda efforts led by the Internet Research Agency, a so-called “troll 
factory” reportedly linked to the Russian government (Bertrand, 2017), by relying on a list of 
deleted Twitter accounts that was handed over to the U.S. Congress by Twitter on 31 October 
2017 as part of their investigation into Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections (Fiegerman 
& Byers, 2017). According to Twitter, a total of 36,746 Russian accounts produced 
approximately 1.4 million tweets in connection to the U.S. elections (Bertrand, 2017). Out of 
these accounts, Twitter established that 2752 were operated by the IRA (United States Senate 
Committee, 2017). In January 2018, this list was expanded to include 3814 IRA-linked accounts 
(Twitter, 2018b). 
The messages explored in this study were posted between 2012 and 2017 by IRA-linked 
accounts. We employ a mixed-methods approach to retrieve, analyze, and manually code 826 
Twitter accounts and 6377 tweets from the IRA that offer insights into the tactics employed by 
foreign agents engaging in “information warfare against the United States of America” (US 
District Court, 2018, p. 6). Drawing on source classification from propaganda studies, we detail 
IRA’s tactical operationalization of Twitter for disguised propaganda purposes. In the following, 
we review the literature on propaganda studies and present an overview of what is currently 
known about the IRA’s disinformation campaigns. We subsequently explore the differences 
between white, grey, and black propaganda distributed by the IRA with clearly-defined 
campaign targets. We expect the relationship between campaign target and propaganda classes to 
reveal IRA’s operational strategies and campaign targets. 
 
Previous work 
Propaganda and information warfare have traditionally been studied in the context of foreign 
policy strategies of nation states, with mass media such as newspapers, radio, and television 
sitting at the center of disinformation campaigns (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2014). In fact, mass 
media and propaganda techniques evolved together in the 20th century towards a state of global 
warfare (Cunningham, 2002; Taylor, 2003). During this period, both the definition and forms of 
propaganda changed dramatically (Welch, 2013), but the centrality of mass media remained a 
relatively stable component of propaganda diffusion (Cunningham, 2002), a development 
captured by Ellul (1965) who argued that modern propaganda could not exist without the mass 
media. Towards the end of the 20th century, where media plurality increased dramatically 
through the rise of cable TV and the Internet, propaganda operations were seen as a remnant of 
the past and largely abandoned in scholarly literature (Cunningham, 2002). Combined with the 
end of the Cold War, propaganda was broadly seen as both technologically and politically 
outdated. 
The notion that increased media diversity made large-scale propaganda campaigns 
obsolete continued with the rise of social platforms, enabling citizens and collectives to produce 
counter-discourses to established norms, practices, and policies. Boler and Nemorin (2013, p. 
411) reflected this optimism by arguing that “the proliferating use of social media and 
communication technologies for purposes of dissent from official government and/or corporate-
interest propaganda offers genuine cause for hope.” By the end of the decade, however, this 
sentiment had changed considerably as the decentralized structure of social media platforms 
enabled not only public deliberation, but also the dissemination of propaganda. Large-scale 
actors such as authoritarian states sought to coordinate propaganda campaigns that appeared to 
derive from within a target population, often unaware of the manipulation (US District Court, 
2018). The emergence of social network sites thus challenged the monopoly enjoyed by the mass 
media (Castells, 2012), but it also offered propagandists a wealth of opportunities to coordinate 
and organize disinformation campaigns through decentralized and distributed networks (Benkler, 
Faris, & Roberts, 2018). 
Upon the consolidation and the ensuing centralization of social platforms, state actors 
efficiently appropriated social media as channels for propaganda, with authoritarian states 
seizing the opportunity to enforce mass censorship and surveillance (Khamis, Gold, & Vaughn, 
2013; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Youmans & York, 2012). Technological advances in 
software development and machine learning enabled automated detection of political dissidents, 
removal of political criticism, and mass dissemination of government propaganda through social 
media. These emerging forms of political manipulation and control constitute a difficult object of 
analysis due to scant and often non-existing data, largely held by social media corporations that 
hesitate to provide external oversight to their data (Bastos & Mercea, 2018b) while offering 
extensive anonymity for content producers and poorly handling abusive content (Farkas, Schou, 
& Neumayer, 2018). 
In the context of the 2016 UK EU membership referendum, research estimates that 
13,493 Twitter accounts comprised automatic posting protocols or social bots—i.e., software-
driven digital agents producing and distributing social media messages (Bastos & Mercea, 2019). 
By liking, disseminating, and re-tweeting content, these accounts collectively produced 63,797 
tweets during the referendum debate. In the US context, Bessi and Ferrara (2016) used similar 
bot-detection techniques to find 7183 Twitter accounts that tweeted the 2016 US elections and 
similarly displayed bot-like characteristics. Despite the reported high incidence of bot activity on 
social media platforms, researchers can only identify bot-like accounts retrospectively based on 
their activity patterns and characteristics that set them apart from human-driven accounts, most 
prominently the ratio of tweets to retweets, which is higher for social bots (Bastos & Mercea, 
2019). 
Establishing the identity of content producers in the social supply chain is challenging in 
cases of disguised social media accounts. While social bots can be identified based on traces of 
computer automation, disguised human-driven accounts can be difficult to recognize because 
they lack unambiguous indicators of automation. Disguised human-driven accounts can neither 
be easily found nor traced back to an original source or controller. Reliable identification of such 
accounts requires collaboration with social media companies which are reluctant to provide such 
support (Hern, 2017). In fact, the list of 3814 deleted accounts identified as linked to the IRA and 
explored in this study was only made public by Twitter by request of the US Congress (United 
States Senate Committee, 2017). 
 
Disguised propaganda and Information Warfare 
Jowett and O'Donnell (2014, p. 7) define propaganda as the “deliberate, systematic attempt to 
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired intent of the propagandist.” Propaganda campaigns are often implemented by state 
actors with the expectation of causing or enhancing information warfare (Jowett & O'Donnell, 
2014; Linebarger, 1948). Unlike propaganda targeted at a state’s own population, information 
warfare is waged against foreign states and it is not restricted to periods of armed warfare; 
instead, these efforts “commence long before hostilities break out or war is declared… and 
continues long after peace treaties have been signed” (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2014, p. 212). After 
the end of the Cold War, the concepts of propaganda and information warfare were perceived as 
anachronistic and rapidly abandoned in scholarly discourse (Winseck, 2008, p. 421). With the 
recent rise of large-scale information campaigns and infiltration through digital media platforms, 
scholars are nonetheless increasingly arguing for the continued relevance of propaganda theory 
(Benkler, et al., 2018; Farkas & Neumayer, 2018; Woolley & Howard, 2019). Western 
democratic and military organizations likewise restored the notion of “information warfare” in 
the context of military build-ups between Russia and NATO allies, particularly the US (Giles, 
2016; US District Court, 2018). 
A key objective of information warfare is to create confusion, disorder, and distrust 
behind enemy lines (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2014; Taylor, 2003). Through the use of grey or black 
propaganda, conflicting states have disseminated rumors and conspiracy theories within enemy 
territories for “morale-sapping, confusing and disorganizing purposes” (Becker, 1949). Within 
propaganda theory, grey propaganda refers to that which has an unidentifiable or whose source is 
difficult to identify, while black propaganda refers to that which claims to derive from within the 
enemy population (Daniels, 2009; Jowett & O'Donnell, 2014). As noted by Daniels (2009), this 
source classification model is problematic due to its racial connotations, but the distinction 
between identifiable (white propaganda), unidentifiable (grey propaganda), and disguised 
sources (black propaganda) has been effectively used to analyze different types of information 
warfare throughout the 20th century. 
 
Internet Research Agency and the Kremlin connection 
The Internet Research Agency (IRA) is a secretive private company based in St. Petersburg 
reportedly orchestrating subversive political social media activities in multiple European 
countries and the US, including the 2016 US elections (Bugorkova, 2015; The Economist, 2018). 
The US District Court (2018) concluded that the company engages in “information warfare” 
based on “fictitious U.S. personas on social media platforms and other Internet-based media.” 
The court also linked the IRA to the Russian government through its parent company, which 
holds various contracts with the Russian government. There is also evidence linking the founder 
of IRA, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, to the Russian political elite. The Russian government has 
nonetheless rejected accusations of involvement in subversive social media activities and 
downplayed the US indictment of Russian individuals (MacFarquhar, 2018). 
The IRA has been dubbed a “troll factory” due to its engagement in social media trolling 
and the incitement of political discord using fake identities (Bennett & Livingston, 2018). This 
term has clear shortcomings, as the agency’s work extends beyond trolling and includes large-
scale subversive operations. According to internal documents leaked in the aftermath of the US 
election, the workload of IRA employees was rigorous and demanding. Employees worked 12-
hour shifts and were expected to manage at least six Facebook fake profiles and ten Twitter fake 
accounts. These accounts produced a minimum of three Facebook posts and 50 tweets a day 
(Seddon, 2014). Additional reports on the subversive operations of the IRA described employees 
writing hundreds of Facebook comments a day and maintaining several blogs (Bugorkova, 
2015). These activities were aimed at sowing discord among the public. In the following, we 
unpack our research questions and our methodological approach, including the challenges posed 
by data collection and retrieval and the study of obfuscated and impersonated Twitter accounts. 
 
Research questions and hypotheses 
This study is informed by propaganda studies and examines a number of exploratory hypotheses 
regarding the tactics and use of disguised propaganda on Twitter. Our first hypothesis draws 
from Becker (1949, p. 1) who argued that black propaganda is an effective means of information 
warfare in contexts of “widespread distrust of ordinary news sources.” This is in line with reports 
of falling trust in the press, with only 33% of Americans, 50% of Britons, and 52% of Germans 
trusting news sources (Newman, Richard Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016). To this end, we 
hypothesize that IRA-linked Twitter accounts will leverage the historical low level of trust in the 
media and deploy mostly black propaganda (H1a) as opposed to grey (H1b) or white (H2c) 
propaganda. 
Secondly, we hypothesize that Russian propaganda is aimed at spreading falsehoods and 
conspiracy theories to drive a wedge between groups in the target country. This is consistent with 
traditional propaganda classes, so hypothesis H2 tests whether black propaganda fosters 
confusion and stokes divisions by spreading fearmongering stories, relies on expletives and 
hostile expression, and disseminates populism appeals that position “the people” against the 
government (H2a); or, alternatively, whether this type of content is disseminated by employing 
(H2b) grey or (H2c) white propaganda (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2014). 
Thirdly, we explore the mechanisms through which the IRA has engaged in subversive 
information warfare, which often comes in the form of propaganda of agitation disseminated to 
stir up tension through the use of “the most simple and violent sentiments… hate is generally its 
most profitable resource” (Ellul, 1965). Following this seminal definition provided by Ellul 
(1965), we seek to test whether IRA propaganda on social media promotes agitation, emotional 
responses, direct behavior, polarization, and support for rumors and conspiracy theories by 
strategically deploying black (H3a), grey (H3b), or white (H3c) propaganda to disseminate these 
sentiments, expressions, and stories. 
Fourth, we rely on an inductive typology of Twitter accounts to explore the IRA 
propaganda strategy across a range of targets, including protest activism (e.g., Black Lives 
Matter), local news diffusion, and conservative ideology. To this end, we convert the typology to 
a numeric variable and test whether the strategic target of IRA campaigns is associated with and 
predictive of propaganda type (H4). Lastly, we unpack this relationship by exploring the 
temporal patterns associated with propaganda classes and campaign targets. 
 
Methods and Data 
 
Data Collection 
Investigating the cohort of 3814 IRA accounts was challenging, as Twitter did not share deleted 
tweets and user profiles with researchers and journalists until October 2018―two years after the 
US elections and a full year after the company admitted to Russian interference (Gadde & Roth, 
2018). In addition to that, Twitter policy determines that content tweeted by users should be 
removed from the platform once the account is deleted or suspended (Twitter, 2018a). As a 
result, the tweets posted by the 3814 IRA accounts are no longer available on Twitter’s Search, 
REST, or Enterprise APIs. 
To circumvent this limitation, we first queried a large topic-specific historical Twitter 
database spanning 2008-2017. This database spanned a range of topics from our previous studies 
on U.S. daily news consumption dating back to 2012 (Bastos & Zago, 2013), Brazilian and 
Ukrainian protests in 2013 and early 2014 (Bastos & Mercea, 2016), the Charlie Hebdo terrorist 
attack in 2015, and the Brexit referendum in 2016 (Bastos & Mercea, 2018a). We found 
evidence of IRA interference across most of the data. In this first step of data collection, we 
retrieved 4989 tweets posted by IRA accounts from the historical datasets. NBC News 
subsequently published a dataset of over 200,000 tweets from 454 IRA accounts curated by 
anonymous researchers (Popken, 2018). The distribution of messages in this dataset is fairly 
skewed, with 140 users having tweeted less than 10 messages and 27 accounts having tweeted 
over 3000 messages. We nonetheless sampled 10 tweets from each account in this database (if 
available), thus retrieving 1388 and expanding our coded dataset to 6377 tweets. 
Lastly, we queried the Wayback Machine API and found 102 user profiles available in 
the Internet Archive. Only a few snapshots included tweeted content, so we relied on Wayback 
Machine as a source of user profile, which is the unit of analysis in this study. The aggregate 
database explored in this study thus consists of 826 user profiles and 6377 tweets posted by IRA-
linked accounts, which translates to just over one-fifth of the accounts identified by Twitter as 
linked to the IRA (21.7% of 3814). The database comprises 15 variables for each account, 
including the textual variables username, user ID, self-reported location, account description, and 
website; the numeric variables account creation date, number of tweets and favorited tweets by 
the account, and the number of followers and followees; and logical or binary variables 
indicating whether the account is verified and protected. The database is text-only and therefore 
we do not have access to images or videos embedded to the tweets created by IRA sources. 
 
Coding and analysis 
Tweets were manually and systematically annotated by an expert coder along 18 variables, 17 of 
which were established deductively. The 18th variable identifies the most prominent issues 
mentioned by the account and was established inductively based on an initial coding of a 
subsample of 10% of tweets. A total of 15 issues were identified as deductive attributes upon 
coding the dataset. In order to ensure consistency, a codebook describing each variable and 
attribute was used throughout the coding (see appendix). Variables are not mutually exclusive, 
nor do they apply to all tweets in the dataset. The manual coding took around 175 hours and an 
overview of the variables for tweets and accounts is presented in Table 1. 
Each IRA account was coded based on three variables: user type, national identity, and 
campaign target. Campaign target was established by training a set of 250 accounts (30% of 
accounts) to render a typology of campaign targets of IRA-operated accounts in our database. 
The typology was created based on recurrent identifiers in account descriptions, language, time 
zone, nationality, and tweeted content. Five broad campaign targets were identified, each 
containing a number of sub-targets: Russian citizens (including Russian politics, Russian news, 
and self-declared Russian propagandists); Brexit (including mainstream media coverage and 
support to the Brexit campaign); Conservative patriots (including Republican content); Protest 
activism (including Black Lives Matter, Anti-Trump, and Anti-Hillary communication); and 
Local news, whose accounts mostly post and retweet mainstream media sources.  
We relied on the typologies described above to generate dependent and independent 
variables guiding this study. The dependent variables are propaganda classes and campaign 
targets. Propaganda classes are divided in identifiable, obfuscated, and impersonated. Campaign 
targets comprise conservative patriots, local news, protest activists, and Brexit. The independent 
variables were calculated by normalizing and subsequently quantifying the instances of 
fearmongering, populist sentiment, emotional charge, polarization, hostility, and conspiracy-
theorizing associated with each IRA-linked account. These variables are analyzed in reference to 
user accounts, which is the unit of analysis underpinning our study. 
 
Table 1: Manually coded variables for IRA tweets and accounts (see appendix for additional information) 
Coding variables: tweets 
1. National context of tweet drawn from content 
2. Language 
3. Retweeted Twitter account 
4. Mentioned or replied Twitter account 
5. Mentioned person or organization (non-Twitter 
user) 
6. Political party mentioned, retweeted, or replied to 
(person or account). 
7. Endorsement of individual, organization, or cause 
8. Disapproval of individual, organization, or cause 
9. Religion  
10. Fatalities (‘risk of fatality’, ‘fatality’, ‘fatalities’, 
‘5+ fatalities’ and ‘mass murder’) 
11. Rumor/conspiracy theory (‘yes’ and ‘high’) 
12. Aggressiveness (‘yes’ and ‘high’). 
13. Antagonism (‘yes’ and ‘high’). 
14. Emotional (‘yes’ and ‘high’). 
15. Encouragement of action (‘vote X’ or ‘share this!’) 
 
16. Populist rhetoric (reference to ‘the people’, ‘anti-
establishment’, ‘anti-mainstream media’, 
‘scapegoating’, ‘call for action’, ‘ethno-cultural 
antagonism’, ‘state of crisis/threat against society’, ‘the 
need for a strong leader’) 
17. Populism spectrum (two attributes: ‘low’ and ‘high’)' 
18. Issues (up to four attributes per tweet based on 15 
attributes established through an inductive coding of a 
sub-set of 10% of tweets) 
 
Coding variables: accounts 
19. User type (eight attributes, including ‘individual 
(male)’, ‘individual (female)’, ‘news source’ and 
‘NGO’)  
20. National user identity (based on declared location, time 
zone, and self-description in user profile and tweets) 
21. Campaign target (based on five overall attributes 
established through an inductive coding of a sub-set of 
30% of accounts) 
 
In summary, the qualitative variables assigned to tweets were subsequently converted to numeric 
and logical scales for hypothesis testing. The variable fearmongeringScore was created by 
calculating the average number of tweets and news articles mentioning fatalities caused by 
natural disasters, crime, acts of terrorism, civil unrest, or accidents. We assign a value of zero to 
tweets with no such mention, 1 when the risk of fatality is mentioned, 2 for direct mentions of 
fatality, 3 for multiple fatalities, 4 for reports of five or more fatalities, and 5 for mass murders 
and military conflicts with several casualties. The variable populistScore was calculated by 
assigning a scale of 0 to 3 based on the incidence of messages appealing, among other things, to 
“the people” in their struggle against a privileged elite (Mudde, 2004). Emotional messages were 
coded in a scale from 0 for not emotional to 2, with messages scoring 2 having the highest levels 
of emotional content. A similar scale was applied to variables “antagonism” and 
“aggressiveness,” with 0 for no such sentiment, 1 for positive matches, and 2 for messages with 
high incidence of said content. We follow similar scales for variables rumor and conspiracy 
theory (6 scales) and the encouragement of offline action. This procedure enabled us to identify 
the propaganda class of each account and six numeric variables that measure the levels of 
fearmongering, populist sentiment, emotional charge, polarization, hostility, conspiracy-
theorization, and incitement to offline action associated with that account. 
 
Limitations of the Method and Data 
The disguised propaganda produced by the IRA and explored in this study has been retrieved by 
trawling through millions of previously archived tweets to identify messages authored by the 
3814 accounts Twitter acknowledged as operated by the IRA. One account turned out to be a 
false-positive and was excluded from the study (Matsakis, 2017). The dataset spans eight years 
and includes tweets with a topical focus on US news outlets, the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in 
2015, and the Brexit debate in 2016. 
A portion of the database was encoded in Latin-1 Supplement of the Unicode block 
standard, which does support Cyrillic characters, hence messages in Russian or Ukrainian could 
not be annotated. A total of 1848 tweets posted during the Euromaidan wave of demonstrations 
and civil unrest in Ukraine were encoded in the Cyrillic alphabet and the tweets could not be 
annotated because they did not include text. We relied on the profile retrieved for these users to 
classify them as Russian, and thus as white propaganda, as Twitter already identified them as 
IRA-linked. We nonetheless acknowledge that the absence of tweets for this cohort of accounts 
impinge on our ability to identify them as sources impersonating Ukrainian as opposed to 
Russian users, in which case the incidence of black propaganda would be considerably higher 
than identified in this study. 
The data explored in this study represents only a portion of the IRA propaganda efforts. 
Accordingly, our study cannot estimate the extent of IRA propaganda on social media nor the 
prevalence of other forms of propaganda tactics. Similarly, the inductive typology employed in 
this study does not necessarily comprehend the totality of strategies deployed by the IRA. Lastly, 
and contrary to our expectations, we identified several pro-Russia accounts claiming to be “run 
by the Kremlin.” While it is not possible to determine the extent to which the Russian 
government was involved in the IRA operations, for the purposes of this study we consider these 
accounts as Russian and therefore as sources of white propaganda. 
 
Results 
The summary statistics allow us to approach hypothesis H1 by inspecting the breakdown of IRA-
linked Twitter accounts dedicated to black, grey, and white propaganda. We find that most 
accounts operated by the Internet Research Agency are dedicated to disseminating black 
propaganda (42%, n= 339), followed by white (40%, n= 319) and grey (18%, n=141) 
propaganda. Similarly, the sample of manually coded tweets follows a comparable distribution, 
with 58% (n=3450) of messages coded as black propaganda as opposed to grey (5%, n=321) or 
white propaganda (37%, n=2205). The distribution of tweets, followers, and followees lend 
further support to H1a, as black propaganda accounts present more capillarity with higher 
number of followers, followees, and average number of messages posted by these accounts 
compared with grey and white accounts. Figure 1 unpacks the differences across classes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of tweets, followers, and followees for accounts dedicated to black, grey, and white propaganda 
We subsequently test hypothesis H2, which hypothesized that IRA efforts to spread falsehoods 
and conspiracy theories would be segmented across propaganda classes, tailored to wedge 
divisions in the target country. The data lend support for hypothesis H2(b), with grey propaganda 
scoring consistently higher than black and white for fearmongering (x̅=.55, .10, .04, 
respectively), populism sentiments (x̅=.35, .19, .02, respectively), and hostility (x̅=.22, .15, .01, 
respectively). The results thus confound our expectations, as the Internet Research Agency seems 
to favor accounts with unidentifiable location and whose affiliation is concealed to disseminate 
fearmongering, populist appeals, and hostile political platforms, including scapegoating and call 
for action against threats to society.  
Hypothesis H3 was approached by probing IRA-linked profiles dedicated to emotion-
charged stories, polarized political commentary, and the spreading of rumors and conspiracy 
stories. We assign a score to each category and calculate the mean and standard deviation across 
propaganda classes. The data lends support to hypothesis H3a, as black propaganda accounts 
show consistently higher scores for each of the variables tested, particularly emotionScore and 
polarizedScore, which averaged .53 and .37 for black propaganda compared with 0.39 and .30 
for grey, and .08 and 0.5 for white propaganda. This pattern also holds for the variable measuring 
posting behavior supporting conspiracy theories, which averaged .46 for black propaganda 
compared with .29 and .09 for grey and white propaganda accounts, respectively. Figure 2 shows 
the breakdown across classes. 
 
 
Figure 2: Breakdown of emotional response, polarization, and conspiracy theorizing across propaganda classes 
The results indicate that grey propaganda is preferred to disseminate fearmongering stories, 
stoking populism sentiments, and encouraging hostile expression. Black propaganda, on the 
other hand, is central to efforts of sowing social discord in the target population. These two 
classes of propaganda were used to stoke fears in the public and they contrast with self-identified 
Russian accounts that tweet mostly pro-Kremlin content. Indeed, the mean score of 
fearmongerScore, populistScore, emotionScore, polarizedScore, hostilityIndex, conspiracyScore, 
and behaviorIndex are significantly higher in black (.10, .19, .53, .37, .15, .46, .12) and grey (.55, 
.36, .39, .30, .22, .28, and .20) propaganda compared with white propaganda, which displays low 
levels of such sentiments (.04, .02, .08, .08, .01, .08, and .05). Fifteen percent of black and 36% 
of grey propaganda accounts engaged in fear mongering compared with only 6% of white 
propaganda accounts. Similarly, 26% of grey and 20% of black accounts tweeted populist 
appeals compared with 2% of white accounts. The trend continues for emotionScore (grey=27%, 
black=54%, white=9%), polarizedScore (grey=34%, black=57%, white=10%), hostilityIndex 
(grey=15%, black=25%, white=2%), conspiracyScore (grey=23%, black=45%, white=8%), and 
behaviorIndex (grey=22%, black=21%, white=5%) 
We further delve into hypothesis H3 by performing a stepwise model selection by Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) to predict account type (black, grey, or white). The returned 
stepwise-selected model includes an ANOVA component that rejects a range of numeric 
variables, including the number of tweets posted by users and the number of lists associated with 
the account, but that incorporates all variables coded for this study. Therefore, the model 
includes fearmongerScore, populistScore, emotionScore, polarizedScore, hostilityScore, 
conspiracyScore, and behaviorScore, with polarizedScore and conspiracyScore being particularly 
significant predictors of account type. The model accounts for nearly half of the variance in the 
data (R2adj=.40, p=6.836e-15). The results lend support to the hypothesis that source 
classification remains a valid framework to understand IRA’s social media operations, as 
account type is significantly associated with the dissemination of polarizing, populist, fear 
mongering, and conspiratorial content. 
 
Table 2: Contingency table of campaign targets by propaganda classes. Local news outlets include the accounts 
impersonating local news (black propaganda) and accounts dedicated to retweeting this content (grey propaganda) 
 Black Grey White 
Brexit 49 14 3 
Conservative patriots 74 1 1 
Local news outlets 45 59 0 
Protest activism  72 11 0 
Russian/Ukrainian issues 1 0 36 
 
Lastly, we approach hypothesis H4 by inductively coding a typology of IRA Twitter accounts 
based on their target campaigns, including protest activism (e.g., Black Lives Matter), local news 
diffusion, and conservative ideology. To this end, we convert the typology to a numeric variable 
and test whether the propaganda classes are associated with and predictive of the IRA campaign 
targets. As shown in Table 2, propaganda classes appear dedicated to specific campaigns, with 
grey propaganda dedicated to local news and the Brexit campaign, black propaganda deployed 
across campaign targets, and white propaganda unsurprisingly covering Russian and potentially 
Ukrainian issues almost exclusively. We subsequently performed another stepwise model 
selection including the campaign target variable, which was found to be a strong predictor of 
propaganda type. Indeed, most variables previously found to be significant were discarded in the 
Stepwise Model Path and only the variables populistScore, emotionScore, polarizedScore, 
conspiracyScore, and campaign target were deemed relevant predictors of account type 
(R2adj=.55, p=2.155e-12). The results are thus consistent with hypothesis H4 and show that 
source classification from propaganda theory is significantly associated with campaign targets. 
The temporal patterns associated with creation and deployment of propaganda accounts 
add further evidence to the strategic deployment of IRA “trolls.” White accounts were largely 
created and deployed in a timeline that mirrors the Euromaidan demonstrations and the civil 
unrest in Ukraine in late 2013 and the ensuing annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in early 
2014. White accounts were often openly pro-Kremlin and tweeted mostly in Russian and 
Ukrainian, another marker of the geographic and linguistic boundaries of this operation. Indeed, 
nearly 70% of white propaganda accounts were created between 2013 and 2014 and nearly 80% 
of the tweets posted by these accounts took place in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. 
Figure 3 unpacks the relationship between account creation date and activity patterns for black, 
grey, and white propaganda accounts. 
 
Figure 3: Account creation date and account activity for black, grey, and white propaganda accounts 
Figure 3 shows that 2013 marks the inception of the black propaganda operation, with over one 
quarter of such accounts created in this period. These accounts however remained largely 
dormant until 2015 and 2016, the period when 80% of their tweets were posted. A significant 
uptake in the creation of black propaganda is observed in the following year (2017), but their 
activity decreases likely due to Twitter terminating this network of black propaganda accounts. 
Grey propaganda accounts, on the other hand, appear to be the most complex operation carried 
out by the IRA. One-third of these accounts was created in 2013 and a further 42% in 2014. 
While 83% of grey accounts were created before 2014, they remained largely dormant until 
2016, when half of the messages tweeted by these accounts are posted. Indeed, the median 
activity of grey accounts falls on June 29, 2016 which is just one week after the United Kingdom 
EU membership referendum and right in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. elections that elected 
Donald Trump. 
 
Figure 4: Account creation date and temporal patterns for IRA campaign targets 
The temporal patterns identified across operations are consistent with the strategic objectives of 
the campaign, which can be divided in short-term, medium-term, and long-term propaganda 
campaigns. Short-term campaigns are often dedicated to domestic issues. Twitter accounts 
covering Russian and potential Ukrainian issues, particularly news and politics, were registered 
between 2013 and 2014 and 85% of their activity is concentrated in 2014 and 2015. A similar 
pattern was observed with accounts dedicated to the Brexit campaign. While a quarter of these 
accounts were registered between 2013 and 2015, half of them were registered only in the run-up 
to the 2016 Brexit campaign. Indeed, 2016 alone accounts for 84% of the activity tweeted by 
these accounts. Medium-term campaigns are exemplified by the network of accounts 
impersonating local news outlets operated by the IRA. Sixty percent of these accounts were 
created between 2013 and 2014, but over 85% of their tweets appeared only in 2015. 
It is however the more targeted campaigns, including conservative patriots and protest 
activism focusing on the Black Lives Matter movement, that display more sparse patterns of 
account creation followed by intense activity, likely a result of IRA securing a supply of 
accounts that are purposed and repurposed for targeted campaigns. Conservative patriot accounts 
were steadily created as far back as 2013 (21%) and 2014 (16%), but they only become active 
and operational in 2016, when 38% of their messages were registered, and in 2017, when 54% of 
this content appeared on Twitter. A similar pattern is revealed with protest activist accounts, 
which were largely created in 2013 when 62% of these accounts were registered, but that were 
only activated in 2017 when 84% of their tweets appeared. For this cohort of accounts, the lag 
between account creation date and activation is of nearly three years, which is a considerable 
departure from short-term campaigns in which accounts are created and deployed within the span 
of a single year. Figure 4 details the temporal differences observed across campaigns. 
 
Discussion 
The classification of IRA accounts shows that the agency deploys campaigns tailored to specific 
propaganda efforts, with little overlap across strategic operations. We identified nine propaganda 
targets with the most prominent being conservative patriots (n=75), black lives matter activists 
(n=50), and local news outlets (n=37). Common to these three propaganda targets is the use of 
US as self-reported location and their tweeting in English, but the hashtags used by these 
accounts follow a strict political agenda defined by the campaign. The other six campaigns 
identified in our inductive classification include Republican Community, Black Lives Matter 
Community, Anti-Trump Journalists, LGBT Communities; Satirical Content; and Warfare News. 
Figure 5 shows the three most prominent campaign targets identified in the data. 
 Figure 5: Account profiles of (a) Conservative Patriots; (b) black lives matter activists; and (c) local news outlets 
Conservative patriot accounts claim to be US citizens and conservatives. They are self-described 
Christian patriots, supporters of the Republican party and of presidential candidate Donald 
Trump. These accounts tweeted predominantly about US politics, conservative values such as 
gun rights, national identity, and the military, along with a relentless agenda against abortion 
rights, “political correctness,” the Democratic party, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, and 
the mainstream media. The user shown in Figure 5a is one such example claiming to be a white 
male based in Texas. The profile description includes hashtags #2A (i.e., second amendment) 
and #tcot (i.e., top conservatives on Twitter) and amassed a total of 41,900 followers. The 
following tweets exemplify the topical focus of this portion of IRA accounts. 
 
It's Election Day. Rip america. #HillaryForPrison2016 #TrumpForPresident  
@archieolivers, 11 August 2016 
 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IS MY GUN PERMIT. ISSUE DATE: 12/15/1791 EXPIRATION DATE: NONE 
#VETS #NRA #CCOT #TCOT #GOP 
@Pati_cooper, 18 August 2016 
 
Black Lives Matter activists claim to be African American citizens supporting or participating in 
the Black Lives Matter movement. These accounts tweeted predominantly about US politics 
along with issues surrounding racial inequality and relied on a range of hashtags, including 
#BlackLivesMatter, #BLM, #WokeAF, and #BlackToLive. The account shown in Figure 5(b), 
with 24,200 followers, exemplifies this target of the IRA campaign. Key objectives of this effort 
appear to have been discouraging African Americans from voting for Hillary Clinton or 
discouraging voting altogether, as exemplified in the following tweets. 
 
RT @TheFinalCall: Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump: Which one is worse: Lucifer, Satan, or The Devil? 
@adrgreerr, 6 October 2016 
 
RT @HappilyNappily: B Clinton Mobilized a army to swell jails with black bodies, Hillary led an attack on 
Libya, they exploited Haiti. 
@claypaigeboo, 6 October 2016 
 
The network of accounts impersonating local news outlets is the third largest propaganda effort 
led by the IRA. This initiative builds on the growing distrust in mainstream media and the 
comparatively higher trust in the local press (Newman, et al., 2016). The US branch of the 
campaign operated accounts that included city names and the words daily, news, post, or voice 
(e.g., DailyLosAngeles, ChicagoDailyNew, DailySanFran, DailySanDiego, KansasDailyNews, 
and DetroitDailyNew). This campaign also targeted German news outlets, where the IRA 
replicated the pattern of using city names followed by the term “Bote,” meaning messenger or 
herald (e.g., FrankfurtBote, HamburgBote, and Stuttgart_Bote). Upon probing the data, we found 
they relay information sourced from established news outlets in the area they operate. The 
tweeting pattern comprises a single headline and does not always include a link to the original 
source. 
When available, we resolved the shortened URLs embedded to tweets to identify the 
news source tweeted by disguised local news accounts. LAOnlineDaily tweeted exclusively Los 
Angeles Times content and ChicagoDailyNew follows a similar pattern having tweeted content 
from the Chicago Tribune. As such, this cohort of news repeaters seems dedicate to replicating 
local news content with a bias towards news items in the crime section and issues surrounding 
public safety, a pattern that was identified with the high scores of emotion-charge and 
polarization associated with the content they selected and relayed. These accounts were created 
between 2014 and 2017 and tweeted on average 30,380 messages per account, thus totaling over 
1M for the entire cohort. They also managed to garner an average of 9753 followers per account 
while following only 7849, an indication that the IRA propaganda efforts might have achieved 
capillarity into communities of users. 
Negative and contentious narratives that amplify concerns about public security, 
particularly crime incidents, but also fatal accidents and natural disasters, dominate the local 
news stories distributed by IRA posing as local news outlets. The most prolific account in our 
dataset is user 2624554209 with a total of 1212 tweets. This account operated under the handle 
DailyLosAngeles in 2016, but it was also active in 2015 under the username LAOnlineDaily and 
it specialized in selecting news items from the Los Angeles Times that emphasized crime, 
casualties, and issues of public safety. In fact, LAOnlineDaily is significantly more likely to 
tweet headlines about fatalities compared with the rest of the IRA-linked accounts. For the 624 
accounts analyzed in this study, on average only 1 in every 5 messages mention fatalities. In 
total, 14.9% of all tweets explicitly refer to events involving one or more deaths, while 9.3% 
refer to incidents with a risk of fatalities, such as violent crime, traffic accidents and natural 
disasters. In contrast, LAOnlineDaily mentions fatalities in every second tweet, with 27.5% of 
messages from this account explicitly referring to deaths and 23.8% referring to events with a 
risk of fatalities. 
 
Conclusion 
The results of this study lend support to the hypothesis that source classification remains a valid 
framework to understand IRA’s social media operations, as account type is significantly 
associated with the dissemination of polarizing, populist, fear mongering, and conspiratorial 
content. Indeed, hypotheses 1-3 show that while grey propaganda is preferred to disseminate 
fearmongering stories, stoking populist sentiments, and encouraging hostile expression, black 
propaganda is central to efforts of sowing social discord in the target population. The testing of 
hypothesis 4, conversely, show that propaganda classes are significantly associated with 
campaign targets and lend support to the hypothesis that IRA operations are planned well in 
advance, with relational coordination between campaign target and propaganda class. 
In summary, these results suggest fundamentally different operations tailored to achieve 
strategic outcomes. This is consistent with the temporal patterns identified across propaganda 
classes and campaign targets. White accounts were largely created and deployed as a reaction to 
the Euromaidan demonstrations and the civil unrest in Ukraine in late 2013. Contrary to our 
expectations, white propaganda accounts were frequently and overtly pro-Kremlin. These 
accounts were created between 2013 and 2014 and nearly 80% of their tweets appeared in 2014 
in the wake of the annexation of Crimea. Black and grey operations also started in 2013, but 
these propaganda operations were only activated in 2015 and 2016, when most of this content 
appeared on Twitter. The Brexit campaign effort, however, seems to follow a short-term 
organizational pattern similar to white propaganda, with a considerable portion of the accounts 
being registered only a few months from the referendum vote. 
The campaign targets identified in this study cover a limited number of political issues 
and were designed to effect change on both ends of the political spectrum, simultaneously 
targeting the conservative base and Black Lives Matter activists. Conservative patriot accounts 
supported the presidential candidate Donald Trump as well as (white) national-conservative 
values. In contrast, Black Lives Matter accounts spoke against the oppression of minorities in the 
US and discouraged African Americans to vote in the 2016 elections. The IRA also run a 
campaign impersonating seemingly uncontroversial local news outlets, but at closer inspection 
these accounts curated headlines with a topical emphasis on crime, disorder, and concerns about 
public security. This pattern of activity is consistent with press reports (MacFarquhar, 2018) that 
evaluated IRA’s systematic use of Twitter to sow discord in the US, to encourage white 
conservatives to vote for Donald Trump, and to discourage African Americans from voting for 
Hillary Clinton. 
But we also found evidence that is at odds with what was reported in the press. Contrary 
to investigations reported in the media (Mak, 2018), the propaganda campaign focused on local 
news was not created to immediately pose as sources for Americans’ hometown headlines. The 
accounts were created as far back as 2013 and while they have not spread misinformation, the 
tweeted headlines were curated to emphasize scaremongering among the population, including 
death tolls and crime stories, with the majority of headlines tweeted by LAOnlineDaily focusing 
on crime and violence in contrast to only 5% for the rest of the accounts. This pattern of account 
creation and activation shows that the IRA likely creates or purchases Twitter accounts in bulk, 
later repurposed to meet the needs of specific campaigns. Indeed, this pattern was observed not 
only in the network of accounts impersonating local news outlets, but also in the network that 
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